Review of Deborah Boyle on Margaret Cavendish by Stewart, Dustin D.
ABO: Interactive Journal for Women in the Arts, 
1640-1830 
Volume 10 
Issue 1 Spring 2020 Article 3 
Review of Deborah Boyle on Margaret Cavendish 
Dustin D. Stewart 
Columbia University, dds2152@columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/abo 
 Part of the Dramatic Literature, Criticism and Theory Commons, Educational Methods Commons, 
Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, and the Literature in English, British Isles Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stewart, Dustin D. () "Review of Deborah Boyle on Margaret Cavendish," ABO: Interactive Journal for 
Women in the Arts, 1640-1830: Vol. 10 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. 
https://www.doi.org/http://doi.org/10.5038/2157-7129.10.1.1229 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/abo/vol10/iss1/3 
This Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in ABO: Interactive Journal for Women in the Arts, 1640-1830 by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. 
For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu. 
Review of Deborah Boyle on Margaret Cavendish 
Abstract 
A review of Deborah Boyle's book The Well-Ordered Universe (2018), by Dustin D. Stewart. 
Creative Commons License 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License 
This reviews is available in ABO: Interactive Journal for Women in the Arts, 1640-1830: 
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/abo/vol10/iss1/3 
Boyle, Deborah. The Well-Ordered Universe: The Philosophy of Margaret 
Cavendish. Oxford University Press, 2018. 273 pp. ISBN 978-0-1902-3480-5.  
 
Reviewed by Dustin D. Stewart 
Columbia University 
 
A carrot knows it’s a carrot, and it knows the rules it has to follow to be good at 
carrothood. The conical bundle of matter that we call a carrot is, in the words of 
philosopher Deborah Boyle, aware of itself and its rightful orientation to the world: 
it recognizes “what the norms are for behaving under various circumstances; it has 
knowledge of what it is to be a carrot—that is, of the nature of carrots” (240). 
Although any given carrot has a capacity for choice and some measure of freedom 
to break the rules, unlike human beings it hardly ever does so. That’s why carrot 
life, as opposed to human life, stays harmonious.  
 
Ignorance is no excuse if every creature—every composite of living matter, each 
slice of which “has perception and knowledge” (76)—innately knows the right way 
to act. Nonhuman creatures may on rare occasions be impeded from living 
normally, and perhaps they grow a bit bored of harmony now and then. Yet human 
beings have a stronger reason for disobeying the standards set by nature to govern 
their actions. “Humans,” explains Boyle, “possess a desire for fame, a desire that is 
simply not present in other creatures, and, because of this, humans are much more 
likely than other creatures not to behave as they ought” (118). Self-love in other 
living things fosters unity, but it becomes corrupt in human beings who, anxious 
about mortality, seek public recognition as “sort of a substitute for continued 
existence” after death (133). Pursuing it has the effect of spoiling most of their 
social arrangements in this life, public as well as private. Bundles of wayward 
human matter ought to know what their rightful place is and how to inhabit it. To 
offset their ruinous desire for fame, though, they have to cooperate through politics, 
defined as “a formal system of rules specifying those roles, as well as officials who 
can enforce the rules” (151). People need “a strong central government—preferably 
with an absolute sovereign—as well as clearly delineated, hierarchical classes and 
roles so that the various members of society know how to behave appropriately” 
(142). Political life at its best, which here means its most hierarchical, can give 
human existence at least a little of the stability that both matter and nature require.  
 
Boyle is describing the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673). Whether 
the picture she draws in her major new study is revisionist will depend on which 
version of her subject her readers have been led to expect. That the prolific 
seventeenth-century writer and sometime political exile was royalist and rank-
obsessed in her thinking will not surprise literary critics who have followed the 
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historicist work on Cavendish that has proliferated over the past fifteen years or so. 
Boyle writes as a philosopher primarily addressing others in her discipline, it must 
be allowed, and so it makes sense that almost nothing of this scholarship appears in 
her footnotes. And yet her findings mostly affirm earlier literary interpretations that 
treat Cavendish’s royalism as (to borrow a phrase from Julie Crawford) a complex 
“ideology of hierarchical order.” For readers familiar with this framework, the big 
takeaway from The Well-Ordered Universe will be a deepened awareness of just 
how many of Cavendish’s philosophical positions boil down to order, obedience, 
even normativity. (One potential objection might indeed be that too many of the 
positions come packaged in such terms. Though Boyle alerts readers that she does 
not “mean to reduce [Cavendish’s] complicated philosophical views to a single 
factor” (11), the stress on hierarchy does often seem a key to any possible lock.)  
 
A different set of readers, meanwhile, will find more to argue with in Boyle’s 
treatment. A lively strand of interdisciplinary work on Cavendish highlights what 
is variously called her vitalist or panpsychist materialism, and, in the wake of 
influential books by John Rogers, Lisa Sarasohn, and (most recently) Jonathan 
Kramnick, some interpreters have been inclined to see Cavendish as a philosopher 
of freedom, bravely rejecting human exceptionalism by ascribing movement, 
knowledge, and experience to everything that exists in the natural world. (In 
Sarasohn’s view, as Boyle quotes her in saying, Cavendish wants to secure “the 
fundamental liberty of all creatures” [33].) Strongly opposed to such a portrait, 
Boyle maintains again and again that “when freedom threatens order, Cavendish 
typically treats order as the higher good” (38). Without quite saying so, the book 
pushes back against a tendency, perhaps less prevalent among philosophers than 
certain object-oriented literary and cultural theorists, to equate materialist thought 
as such with some kind of political radicalism or egalitarianism. It doesn’t take 
much reading of Thomas Hobbes to know that materialism can push in authoritarian 
directions as well, and Boyle’s Cavendish belongs squarely with Hobbes (and with 
William Davenant, whose poem Gondibert (1651) pops up several times) and not 
with Spinoza. The subject of the present study goes further than Hobbes does, in 
fact, to naturalize differences of rank and to dress obedience to authority in the 
language of liberty.  
 
Several negative conclusions follow from the case that Cavendish subordinates 
freedom to order, with Boyle taking some satisfaction in popping bubbly notions 
that the early modern author shares progressive social views held by her modern 
readers. For one thing, Boyle insists, Cavendish was no feminist. Neither, for 
another, was she any kind of environmentalist.  
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Extending a discussion of the author’s “deeply conservative” perspective on social 
class (163), the seventh chapter (“Gender Roles and the Roles of Nature”) proposes 
that Cavendish’s ideas about gender were more consistent and more conventional 
than scholars have cared to admit. Unfortunately, this is the most disappointing part 
of the book, the trouble being that the real-life Cavendish and several of her 
fictional characters emerge as striking exceptions to the traditional feminine roles 
and virtues celebrated elsewhere in her writing. Cavendish likewise seems to be 
talking about other people, not herself, when she discusses the trouble with desiring 
fame. Boyle never succeeds in explaining away this problem of exceptionality, 
though she does try, contending that the women who perform masculinity in The 
Blazing World (1666) and Bell in Campo (1662) are actually failures who reinforce 
conservative norms and that Cavendish’s own outlandish “cross-dressing,” in her 
writing no less than her wardrobe, was not finally “contrary to feminine virtue” 
(174). Perhaps more attention to the work on Cavendish’s literary-historical context 
may have been helpful here. Instead of agreeing that Cavendish wasn’t perverse or 
non-normative in her performance of gender, these studies indicate that she saw her 
perversity as sanctioned by her aristocratic standing, the sort of freedom made 
possible (though only for a few) within a rigid hierarchy. At any rate, the chapter 
on gender leans rather heavily on criticism and theory from the 1980s and ’90s, a 
tendency that becomes problematic when Boyle takes up Cavendish’s stance on 
hermaphroditism. Here again the reader is asked to prioritize what the writer 
sometimes says over what she frequently does.  
 
The chapter also betrays some limitations of Boyle’s methodology, to which I am 
otherwise highly sympathetic. As she explains in a footnote early on, “if 
inconsistencies in Cavendish’s writings can be resolved by appeal to her other texts, 
then that reading is preferable to leaving the conflict unresolved” (22, note 59). One 
of the book’s foremost achievements lies in its refusal to accept an old picture of 
Cavendish as a hopelessly erratic thinker. Most of Boyle’s footnotes refer readers 
from one Cavendish text to another (if not two more), and her ambitious strategy, 
wading through everything her subject wrote in an effort to pin down what she 
really thought, works best in three early chapters on Cavendish’s conception of 
nature and the evolution of her theory of matter. Running from Chapter 2 through 
Chapter 4, and dealing especially with Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655, 
1663), Philosophical Letters (1664), Observations upon Experimental Philosophy 
(1666), and Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668), this material constitutes the 
heart of the book. Particularly illuminating are sections analyzing Cavendish’s 
claims that different sorts of matter are arrayed hierarchically (64-72), that nature 
is eternal yet somehow distinct from God (78-83), and that causation is reconcilable 
with free will (97-104). Her theory of occasional causation holds, in brief, that when 
one ball strikes another, the second ball doesn’t receive motion from the first but 
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moves by its own power. The first ball may entice the second, yes, and the second 
may opt to imitate the first, but it isn’t impelled to do so. This theory has wide-
ranging implications, as later chapters show, helping to clarify Cavendish’s model 
of sensory perception and her partly Galenist understanding of health and sickness. 
According to Cavendish, it is not the case that a disease agent directly causes 
sickness; rather, its movements are imitated by parts of the host’s body, which in 
the misguided act of imitation make themselves ill.  
 
Yet the writer’s fiction, whether presented in verse, prose, or drama, often proves 
resistant to the philosopher’s impressively orderly approach to conflict resolution. 
Sometimes Boyle decides which voice in a polyvocal literary text best reflects 
Cavendish’s own opinions, diminishing the formal significance of the polyvocality 
along the way, though sometimes she is forced to concede that strange things can 
happen in imaginative writing that do not fit very neatly into a coherent 
philosophical system: “what Cavendish says about the creatures in the imaginary 
worlds may not be applicable to those in our world” (205). Fiction keeps situating 
itself at the limits of order, and yet Cavendish rarely shied away from bringing some 
of the transgressive strangeness out of the worlds she imagined and into the real 
one in which she lived. Questions linger as to what happens when those of us who 
read Cavendish’s fiction immerse ourselves in her inventions—whether we become 
participants in or mere witnesses to her aristocratic freedom from constraint, 
relative and qualified though that freedom must be. It is consoling to think that we 
too are able to test matter’s boundaries and challenge nature’s norms in our reading, 
building fantastical realms that follow different rules. But Boyle’s Cavendish might 
be using that very dream to condition us to remain good carrots, mindful that we 
ought not to imitate her dazzling mobility but should accept our proper place in the 
ground, waiting to be consumed. 
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